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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A police officer seized Monica F. Wolfe’s cell phone during an interview at the police
station. The officer did not have a warrant or other exigent circumstances to justify the seizure.
Consequently, Ms. Wolfe moved to suppress the evidence obtained following the seizure, and
the district court granted her motion. The State now appeals. In arguing the district court erred by
denying the motion, the State relies entirely upon an exception to the exclusionary rule that the
State did not present to the district court. Due to the State’s failure to preserve this basis for
denying the motion, and, if considered, the absence of factual findings to rule on or support it,
Ms. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order granting her
motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 16, 2017, Detective Kari Siebel with the Nampa Police Department interviewed
Ms. Wolfe regarding Detective Siebel’s investigation of a poisoned dog and a conspiracy to
murder Ms. Wolfe’s ex-husband. (Tr., p.10, Ls.6–12, p.25, Ls.7–9, p.26, Ls.10–18; R., p.117;
State’s Aug. R., pp.11–12.) Detective Siebel seized Ms. Wolfe’s cell phone during the interview.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.23–24, p.25, Ls.7–12.) Detective Siebel hoped to find text messages, photographs,
Google searches, or emails related to these alleged offenses on the phone. (Tr., p.26, Ls.10–23.)
Detective Siebel subsequently applied for a search warrant for the phone. (Tr., p.27,
L.24–p.28, L.1.) She did not search the phone until she obtained the warrant. (Tr., p.28, Ls.2–4.)
The search of Ms. Wolfe’s phone led to the application for another search warrant for a Google
account presumably used by Ms. Wolfe. (State’s Aug. R., pp.5–15.) Detective Siebel’s affidavit
of probable cause to search the Google account stated that, during the search of phone, law
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enforcement observed this Google account, but did not log in because the phone search warrant
did not authorize it. (State’s Aug. R., p.12.) Detective Seibel also stated in her affidavit that,
upon seizing Ms. Wolfe’s phone, Detective Seibel asked Ms. Wolfe, “if when the cell phone was
searched, would there be any text messages or emails asking people to kill [your ex-husband],”
and Ms. Wolfe said, “yes.” (State’s Aug. R., p.12.) Ms. Wolfe explained to Detective Seibel that
these texts or emails were “pillow talk” and “fantasy” and “you have to take them in context . . .
if I was angry . . . or joking.” (State’s Aug. R., pp.11–12.) The magistrate judge issued a search
warrant for Google account. (State’s Aug. R., pp.1–3.)
In November 2017, the State filed an Indictment charging Ms. Wolfe with conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder and aiding and abetting poisoning animals. (R., pp.11–13.)
Ms. Wolfe filed a motion to suppress on two grounds:  a void search warrant for the Google
account and the warrantless seizure of her phone. (R., pp.63–66.) With respect to the phone,
Ms. Wolfe argued Detective Seibel seized her phone without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances. (R., p.65.) As such, she argued the phone and “any fruits of the illegally seized
phone . . . must be suppressed.” (R., p.65.) Ms. Wolfe also filed a motion to dismiss the charges
due to improperly admitted evidence and violations of the Idaho Criminal Rules during the grand
jury proceedings. (R., pp.54–61.)
 The State objected to the motion to suppress. (R., pp.72–79.) For the phone, the State
argued Detective Seibel “had ample cause for issuance of the warrant in advance of the seizure,”
so the warrantless seizure was “permissible to preserve evidence.” (R., pp.75–76 (capitalization
omitted).) Put another way, the State asserted, “[P]robable cause existed to obtain the search
warrant at the time of the seizure, therefore, the holding of the cell phone while a warrant was
obtained is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (R., p.77.) The State continued, if the
3
seizure “does implicate the Fourth Amendment, the seizure was justified by exigent
circumstances.” (R., p.77; see R., pp.77–78.) The State concluded:
[T]he seizure of the defendant’s phone was a temporary measure to ensure
preservation of evidence while a warrant was obtained. Probable cause existed
before the seizure to issue a search warrant, thus the Defendant’s fourth
amendment rights were not infringed upon. Finally, even if the court determines
the seizure of the phone did touch upon the defendant’s fourth amendment rights,
it was justified by exigent circumstances.
(R., pp.78–79 (sic).) The State offered no other exceptions to the warrant requirement to allow
Detective Seibel’s warrantless seizure of the phone. (See R., pp.74–79.) The State also objected
to Ms. Wolfe’s motion to dismiss. (R., pp.80–92.)
At a hearing on Ms. Wolfe’s motions,  Detective Seibel testified that Ms. Wolfe did not
give her consent to seize the phone. (Tr.,  p.16, Ls.5–7.)  Detective Seibel also testified that she
had no reason to believe Ms. Wolfe would destroy the phone. (Tr., p.18, Ls.20–22.) The district
court admitted the search warrant documents for the Google account as Defendant’s Exhibits B,
C, D, and E. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1–2, p.14, Ls.7–8; State’s Aug. R., pp.1–37.) The State did not offer
any exhibits. (See generally Tr., p.5, L.4–p.81, L.2.)
After  Detective  Seibel’s  testimony,  Ms.  Wolfe  argued  Detective  Seibel  had  neither
consent  nor  exigent  circumstances  to  seize  the  phone  without  a  warrant.  (Tr.,  p.38,  L.15–p.40,
L.7.) With respect to the phone, the State argued:
And secondly, on the issue of the seizure of the phone, we’ve also heard
testimony today that the testimony or that the seizure of the phone was based on
prior investigations that led her to believe that there was certain information or
evidence that may be contained on that phone.
We also heard testimony today that at the time that it was seized, the
Defendant was not under arrest. She could have left at any time with that phone.
We’ve also heard testimony that everything that she anticipated searching, the text
messages, the emails, et cetera, are all able to be deleted off of that phone.
The question that was asked by defense counsel is whether or not she
believed that there was any -- whether or not she believed the Defendant would
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destroy the phone. I  believe that’s a distinct question. And to that,  she answered
no.
But when it comes down to the actual contents of the phone, the text
messages  and  the  emails  that  would  potentially  be  searched  through,  that  is
readily destructible.
Your Honor, there was also testimony and it’s contained in the brief that
she did understand that she was under investigation. That becomes very clear in
the interview and the portions that I’ve contained in my brief.
She knew that she was under investigation. She did have in her possession
a phone that potentially contained incriminating evidence. And I believe -- and
the officer didn’t want her simply leaving with that.
The process of obtaining a search warrant would have forced her to either
detain  the  Defendant  or  to  do  as  she  did  and  detain  simply  or  seize  simply  the
phone. And then she did go through the process of obtaining that search warrant
subsequent [sic].
There was no search of the phone. As such, there’s no actual evidence that
was obtained by the seizure of the phone alone and nothing to be suppressed
there.
(Tr., p.42, L.7–p.43, L.20.) The parties also submitted argument on the other basis for
suppression and on Ms. Wolfe’s motion to dismiss. (See generally Tr., p.33, L.19–p.73, L.6,
p.79, L.22–p.80, L.20.) The district court took both motions under advisement. (Tr., p.73, Ls.7–
8.)
On April 23, 2018, the district court issued a single order granting in part and denying in
part both of Ms. Wolfe’s motions. (R., pp.103–21) After reviewing the alleged issues with the
grand jury proceedings, (R., pp.104–13), the district court dismissed the conspiracy to commit
murder charge due to insufficient evidence. (R., pp.113–16.) The district court characterized the
evidence for aiding and abetting poisoning animals as “tenuous,” yet adequate to meet the low
standard of probable cause. (R., p.117.)
The district court then turned to Ms. Wolfe’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.117–21.) The
district court first noted that the search warrant for Ms. Wolfe’s phone was not offered into
evidence  at  the  hearing.  (R.,  p.118.)  The  district  court  also  recognized  that  there  were  no
challenges to the validity of the phone search warrant or the existence of probable cause to seize
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the  phone.  (R.,  p.118.)  The  district  court  identified  the  issue  as  the  legality  of  the  warrantless
seizure of the phone and the delay until the issuance of the warrant. (R., p.118.) The district court
rejected both of the State’s proffered exceptions to the warrant requirement:  consent or exigent
circumstances. (R., pp.118–19.) The district court ruled, based on Detective Seibel’s testimony,
Ms. Wolfe did not consent to the seizure. (R., p.118.) Next, the district court ruled, “[u]nder the
totality  of  the  circumstances,  .  .  .  there  were  no  exigent  circumstances  in  this  case  that  would
justify the seizure of the phone without a warrant.” (R., p.119.) “Given this,” the district court
held, “the warrantless seizure of the phone was illegal and any information obtained therefrom
shall be suppressed.” (R., p.119.) On the second ground for suppression (the void search warrant
for the Google account), the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.119–20.)
On May 4, 2018, the State moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order granting
the motion to suppress in part. (R., pp.136–43.) The State made two new arguments against
suppression. (R., pp.137–43.) First, the State argued Ms. Wolfe abandoned the phone.
(R., pp.137–39.) Second, and related to its prior argument, the State argued Detective Seibel’s
warrantless seizure of the phone, with probable cause, “in order to get a warrant is valid under
the Fourth Amendment.” (R., p.139 (capitalization omitted), see also R., pp.141–42.) As part of
this argument, the State argued the attenuation doctrine applied to the seizure of the phone.
(R., pp.139–42.) The State summarized State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004), and State v.
Bingham, 141 Idaho 732 (Ct. App. 2005), two attenuation doctrine cases. (R., pp.139–40.) The
State also summarized State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299 (2014), an independent source doctrine
case, along with a conclusory statement, “[i]n the present case, regardless of whether the warrant
application were to include the statements obtained after the seizure of the phone, there was
probable cause to obtain a warrant.” (R., p.140.) The State then argued the attenuation doctrine
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was “appropriate” and discussed the three relevant factors for attenuation. (R., p.142.) Ms. Wolfe
objected to the State’s motion. (Def.’s Aug. R., pp.19–23.)
On May 15, 2018, the district court held a hearing on the State’s motion to reconsider.
(Tr., p.82, L.4–p.139, L.16.) During the State’s argument, the State realized that the search
warrant  for  Ms.  Wolfe’s  phone  had  not  been  admitted  into  evidence  at  the  first  hearing.  (See
Tr., p.92, L.3–p.93, L.15, p.100, L.4–p.101, L.11.) The State “offered no explanation . . . other
than to indicate that it mistakenly believed” the district court had the exhibit. (R., p.164 n.1.) To
remedy this omission, the State moved for admission of the phone search warrant as State’s
Exhibit 1, and the district court took its admission under advisement. (Tr., p.92, L.3–p.93, L.15.)
The parties primarily disputed whether the State could move for reconsideration with new
arguments (and the newly offered evidence of the phone search warrant). (See generally
Tr., p.87, L.17–p.137, L.17.) As for the merits, the State first argued Ms. Wolfe abandoned the
phone. (Tr., p.101, L.12–p.105, L.17.) Second, the State argued for the application of the
attenuation doctrine. (Tr., p.105, L.18–p.111, L.24.) At the end of the State’s argument, the
district court asked the State:
THE  COURT:  One  of  the  questions  that  I  have  --  and  I  believe  it’s  the Russo
(phonetic) case that you cited to. That’s an independent source case. You put it
under the heading of attenuation doctrine. But are you arguing attenuation or are
you arguing independent source as well?
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your  Honor,  I  did  wish  to  fit  that  within  the  realm  of
attenuation. I understand that there are some -- there is some overlap in the way
the case could be interpreted as an independent source. But I think I’m fitting that
within the umbrella of attenuation.
(Tr., p.111, L.25–p.112, L.10.) The district court took the motion under advisement. (Tr., p.137,
Ls.6–10.)
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On May 25, 2018, the district court issued a memorandum and order denying the State’s
motion to reconsider. (R., pp.162–70.) The district court admitted State’s Exhibit 1 (the search
warrant  for  Ms.  Wolfe’s  phone)  “for  the  purpose  of  the  pending  motion  to  establish  when  a
warrant was initially sought following the seizure of the telephone.” (R., p.165; see Def.’s Aug.
R.,1 pp.1–18.) The district court found that Detective Seibel applied for a search warrant on June
21, 2017, five days after its seizure, and law enforcement executed the warrant on July 6, 2017.2
(R., p.164; Def.’s Aug. R., pp.14, 18.) The district court again rejected the State’s arguments to
justify the warrantless seizure. (R., pp.165–70.) The district court first held Ms. Wolfe did not
abandon the phone. (R., pp.165–67.) The district court then reiterated the absence of exigent
circumstances. (R., pp.167–68.) Next, the district court held the “issuance of a subsequent
warrant did not cure the unlawful seizure.” (R., pp.168–69.) Finally, the district court held the
attenuation doctrine did not apply to the facts. (R., pp.169–70.)
On June 4, 2018, the State filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.172–74.)
1 Contemporaneously with this brief’s filing, Ms. Wolfe has moved to augment the record with
(1)  State’s  Exhibit  1,  the  search  warrant  for  Ms.  Wolfe’s  phone,  and  (2)  her  objection  to  the
State’s motion for reconsideration.
2 The Search Warrant Return, however, states law enforcement executed the warrant on July 11,
2017. (Def.’s Aug. R., p.18.)
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ISSUE
The State frames the issue on appeal as:
Did  the  district  court  err  by  applying  the  exclusionary  rule  where  the  cell  phone  in
question was seized without a warrant but was searched only after, and pursuant to, a
valid search warrant?
Ms. Wolfe rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly grant Ms. Wolfe’s motion to suppress when, for the first
time on appeal, the State offers an unpreserved, yet still inapplicable, exception to the
exclusionary rule to admit evidence from the illegal seizure?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Granted Ms. Wolfe’s Motion To Suppress When, For The First Time
On Appeal, The State Offers An Unpreserved, Yet Still Inapplicable, Exception To The
Exclusionary Rule To Admit Evidence From The Illegal Seizure
A. Introduction
For the first time on appeal, the State argues the district court erred by granting
Ms. Wolfe’s motion to suppress because the independent source doctrine applied to the
subsequent search of the phone pursuant to the warrant. The State did not argue this doctrine
below. In fact, the State briefed and then orally confirmed its presentation of the attenuation
doctrine only. The State cannot present this new exception to the exclusionary rule for the first
time on  appeal.  For  this  reason  alone,  Ms.  Wolfe  submits  this  Court  should  affirm the  district
court’s order granting her motion to suppress in part.
Even if the State’s argument is preserved, the independent source doctrine does not apply
for multiple reasons. For one, the State did not present sufficient evidence in the district court to
provide the necessary factual findings for this Court to evaluate the independent source doctrine.
Similarly, application of the existing facts found by the district court demonstrates that this
doctrine would not permit the admission of evidence following the illegal seizure. Therefore, if
the independent source doctrine is considered, this Court still should affirm the district court’s
decision.
B. Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to
suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept the trial court’s
findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014).
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“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Ellis,
155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C. This Court Should Affirm The District Court’s Order Granting Ms. Wolfe’s Motion To
Suppress Because The State’s Only Argument Is Neither Preserved Nor Applicable
Ms. Wolfe submits two arguments on appeal. First, she contends this Court should
decline to consider the State’s only argument on appeal—the independent source doctrine—
because the State did not argue this exception to the exclusionary rule in the district court.
Second, she asserts the independent source doctrine does not apply to the facts found by the
district court. Since the State put forth no other argument on appeal,3 Ms. Wolfe maintains the
State has shown no error in the district court’s decision to grant her motion to suppress in part.
1. The Independent Source Doctrine Is Not Preserved And Thus Cannot Be Raised
On Appeal Because The State Never Argued The Search Warrant Provided An
Independent Source Of Evidence From The Illegal Seizure
On appeal, the State argues this Court should apply the independent source doctrine to
allow  the  admission  of  evidence  from  the  search  of  Ms.  Wolfe’s  phone.  The  State  never
presented this exception to the exclusionary rule to the district court and arguably waived this
exception at the hearing on its motion for reconsideration. Based on this Court’s and the Courts
of Appeals’ now well-established precedent barring new arguments on appeal, this Court should
decline to address the State’s argument.
3 The State does not challenge the district court’s factual findings or any other rulings on appeal.
(See App. Br., pp.4–7.)
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a. The State did not argue the independent source doctrine below
In  its  Appellant’s  Brief,  the  State  framed the  issue  as:  “The  district  court  erred  when it
applied the exclusionary rule where the cell phone in question was searched pursuant to a valid
search warrant.” (App. Br., p.4 (capitalization omitted).) The State explained, “Application of
relevant legal standards to the facts found by the district court shows that the evidence obtained
from the cell phone was the product of a search conducted under a valid search warrant,
untainted by any illegality in the seizure of the phone, and therefore the evidence was not subject
to exclusion.” (App. Br., p.4.) After reviewing general Fourth Amendment and exclusionary rule
principles, (App. Br., pp.5–6), the State referenced the inevitable discovery and independent
source doctrines. (App. Br., p.6.) The State next argued this case contained “indistinguishable
facts” from State v. Davis, 159 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 2015), an independent source doctrine case.
(App.  Br.,  p.6.)  The  State  summarized Davis and then argued: “The exclusionary rule did not
apply in this case. The evidence was obtained by execution of a search warrant that was
untainted by any illegality in the seizure. (R., pp.118-19.)4 The  district  court  erred  by  granting
suppression.” (App. Br., pp.6–7.) The State offered no other argument on appeal.
The  State’s  argument  is  not  preserved.  In  the  district  court,  the  State  argued  in  its
objection to the suppression motion:
Seizure of property prior to obtaining a warrant in order to preserve
evidence does not necessitate suppression of evidence seized after a valid warrant
4 The State’s citation here refers to the district court’s analysis in its order granting Ms. Wolfe’s
motion to suppress. It contains the district court’s discussion of the consent and exigent
circumstances exceptions put forth by the State. (R., pp.118–19.) It contains no factual findings
or legal conclusions pertaining to a search warrant untainted by the seizure’s illegality, i.e., the
independent source doctrine. Indeed, the district court stated, “It is the Court’s understanding that
there were multiple search warrants issues in this case. Neither of those offered into evidence at
the hearing encompassed the phone that was seized by Detective Seibel.” (R., p.118.) Although
the district court later admitted the phone search warrant for a limited purpose, the State has not
included this search warrant in the record on appeal.
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is obtained, as long as probable cause to obtain a search warrant is based entirely
on facts known prior to the seizure. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 800
(1984). In Segura, officers entered a home, effectively seizing the contents, 19
hours prior to obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 801.  Segura sought suppression
of all evidence seized after the entry into the home. Id. at 804.  Suppression was
denied, as the court determined, the agents had abundant probable cause in
advance  of  their  entry  to  believe  that  there  was  a  criminal  drug  operation  being
carried on in petitioners’ apartment. Id. at 810. In the present case, Detective
Seibel had ample cause for issuance of the warrant in advance of the seizure. See
[State’s Exhibit 1].5 No evidence was obtained from the seizure.  All evidence
from the phone was secured after the issuance of the warrant.
Different interests are implicated by a seizure than by a search. Segura,
468 U.S. at 806, (citing to United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-
14 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970)). A seizure affects
only the person’s possessory interests; a search affects a person’s privacy
interests. Id.,  (citing to Jacobsen, 466 US at 113; Chadwick, 433 US at 13-14.)
Recognizing the generally less intrusive nature of a seizure, the Court has
frequently approved warrantless seizures of property, on the basis of probable
cause, for the time necessary to secure a warrant, where a warrantless search was
either held to be or likely would have been held impermissible.  Id. (citing to
Chambers, 399 US at 51; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13-14; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979)).
The Chambers Court declared, “[f]or constitutional purposes, we see no
difference between on the one hand seizing and holding the car before presenting
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 808. As discussed above,
probable cause existed to obtain the search warrant at the time of the seizure,
therefore, the holding of the cell phone while a warrant was obtained is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
If the court determines the seizure of the phone does implicate the Fourth
Amendment, the seizure was justified by exigent circumstances. . . .
(R., pp.75–77 (sic).) Although Segura is, in part, an independent source case, the State did not
rely on it for that exception to the exclusionary rule. Rather, the State presented the argument
that Detective Seibel’s seizure of the phone was permissible and reasonable, and thus not a
Fourth Amendment violation, because the seizure’s purpose was to preserve evidence until the
issuance of the warrant. The State’s argument as a whole plainly addresses whether the seizure
5 Again, the State did not offer Detective Seibel’s affidavit in support of the phone search
warrant at the suppression motion hearing. (See R., p.118.)
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itself “implicate[d]” the Fourth Amendment, not whether the evidence was admissible from an
independent source. (R., p.77.) In short, the State argued the seizure was lawful.
Moreover, four subsequent representations by the State and the district court support this
reading of the State’s argument. First, the State’s argument at the suppression motion hearing did
not assert the independent source doctrine. (Tr., p.42, L.7–p.43, L.20.) The State argued the
seizure was reasonable to secure the phone or justified by exigent circumstances and, since the
Detective Seibel did not search the phone, there was “nothing to be suppressed there.” (Tr., p.42,
L.7–p.43, L.20.) Second, the district court did not understand the State’s argument to be an
assertion of the independent source doctrine. (R., pp.117–19.) Third, the State’s motion for
reconsideration clearly argued an exception to the exclusionary rule, and that exception was not
the independent source doctrine. (R., pp.139–42.) Along with the State’s renewed argument that,
because Detective Seibel had probable cause, the seizure of the phone to preserve evidence until
the issuance of the warrant was reasonable, the State argued the “application of the attenuation
doctrine” was “appropriate.” (R., p.142.) Not once did the State assert the district court
misunderstood its initial argument and failed to apply the independent source doctrine.6
6 Similarly,  the district  court  did not understand the State’s arguments on reconsideration to be
assertions of the independent source doctrine:
Defendant argued that the cell phone was improperly seized without a warrant and
that no exception to the warrant requirement existed. The  State  responded  that
seizure  of  the  cell  phone  was  permissible  because  probable cause existed at
the time of the seizure and that a search warrant was obtained prior to search of
the  telephone. The  State  also  argued  that   if   an  exception  to  the  warrant
requirement  was necessary, exigent circumstances existed allowing a warrantless
seizure of the cell phone. . . . The  motion  for  reconsideration  asserts  that  the
Court  erred  in  its initial decision. The State once again asserts that a cell phone
may always be seized prior to a warrant where probable cause exists, and a
warrant is subsequently obtained for its search. The State also asserted new
theories that were not made at the time of the initial hearing. The State now
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(R., pp.139–42.) Finally, the State’s argument at the hearing on its motion confirmed the State
was not pursuing the independent source doctrine. For one, the State again referenced Segura,
but not for the independent source doctrine. (Tr., p.105, Ls.18–21.) The State maintained Segura
allowed “the seizure of the phone for preservation of evidence to obtain a warrant.” (Tr., p.105,
Ls.18–21.) Further, upon the district court’s inquiry if the State was arguing for an independent
source (based on its Russo citation),  the  State  answered:   “Your  Honor,  I  did  wish  to  fit  that
within the realm of attenuation. I understand that there are some -- there is some overlap in the
way the case could be interpreted as an independent source. But I think I’m fitting that within the
umbrella of attenuation.” (Tr., p.111, L.25–p.112, L.10.) The State’s answer was, at most, a
waiver of the independent source doctrine and, at the very least, a confirmation that the State was
not pursuing this argument. In summary, the State’s written and oral representations to the
district court are a far cry from the State’s argument on appeal that the independent source
doctrine applies to the evidence obtained from Ms. Wolfe’s phone. The State failed to preserve
this issue for appellate review.
b. Unpreserved issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
This Court has “long held that ‘[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence,
theories and arguments that were presented below.’” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,
275 (2017) (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 (2007)); see also State v. Fuller, 163
Idaho 585, 591 (2018) (same). Moreover, the State is bound by its legal concessions made in the
lower court. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). The preservation doctrine exists for a
asserts that the cell phone was abandoned by the Defendant and alternatively that
the Attenuation Doctrine precludes suppression.
(R., pp.162–63 (emphasis added).) These arguments are not assertions of the independent source
doctrine.
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variety  of  reasons:   to  divide  labor  between  the  trial  and  appellate  courts,  to  limit  the  cost  of
litigation by narrowing issues, to ensure the court’s review of the strongest possible arguments,
and to define the bounds of judicial power. State v. Islas, No. 45174, 2018 WL 6332537, at *3
(Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2018) (citations omitted).
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” Garcia-
Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275 (quoting Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub.
Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800 (1979)). This preservation rule extends to exceptions to the
warrant requirement or other grounds to justify a warrantless search or seizure. Fuller, 163 Idaho
at 590–91 (State cannot argue new justification for seizure for first time on appeal); Cohagan,
162 Idaho at 721 (State cannot argue seizure was lawful when conceded as illegal below);
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 274–76 (State cannot argue new justification for warrantless
arrest for first time on appeal); Islas, 2018 WL 6332537, at *9 (State bound by concession that
certain evidence subject to suppression, and State cannot argue new exceptions, including
inevitable discovery, for the first time on appeal).
Recently, the Court of Appeals in Islas explored the preservation doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment context. The Islas Court reasoned, because the State has the burden to establish an
exception to the warrant requirement or other “reasonableness” to justify the warrantless
intrusion, the onus is on the State to determine “the exceptions it intends to argue as the basis for
admitting the evidence, admit the evidence that is relevant to that exception, and then argue the
exception to the district court.” 2018 WL 6332537, at *6. Through the State properly raising its
argument, the defendant has an opportunity to address it and the district court can make the
relevant findings. Id. The Islas Court  further  explained  it  is  not  the  district  court’s  “job  .  .  .  to
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identify all the possible exceptions to the warrant requirement and provide factual findings and
legal conclusions on each possible exception.” Id. at *7. “Instead,” it is the State’s job “to
identify, with particularity, the exceptions on which it is basing the admission of the evidence so
the trial court can make the appropriate factual and legal findings.” Id. (emphasis added). “To
require appellate courts to do that which [the appellate courts] do not require of the trial court
means that appellate courts would not review, but instead decide in the first instance, the validity
of a search and subsequent seizure on a theory or argument not addressed by the district court.”
Id. This would run contrary to the many purposes of the preservation doctrine. Thus, the Court’s
preservation rules require “the specific argument (the precise exception to the warrant
requirement or the basis for the application of the exception) be presented to the trial court in
order to be raised on appeal.” Id. at *6. This requirement “permits the trial court to rule on the
issue with which it is presented and provides a level appellate playing field.” Id.
Here, as explored above, the State did not argue the independent source doctrine in the
district court. And the State bore the burden to establish this exception to the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 & n.5 (1984). By failing to make this argument
below, Ms. Wolfe did not have the opportunity to respond to the independent source doctrine,
and the district court was unable to make the relevant factual findings. The State now asks this
Court, in the first instance, to decide whether the independent source doctrine applies, to identify
the relevant facts and inferences, and to apply those facts to the doctrine—all without the benefit
of the State’s argument, its presentation of pertinent evidence, Ms. Wolfe’s response or evidence
in opposition, and findings of fact or analysis by the district court. This Court should decline to
rule on the independent source doctrine for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Garcia-Rodriguez,
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162 Idaho at 274–76. For this reason alone, Ms. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the district court’s order granting her motion to suppress in part.
2. Even If Preserved, The Independent Source Doctrine Does Not Apply To The
Facts Found Because The State Presented No Evidence That The Search Warrant
Was Independent From Or Untainted By The Illegal Seizure
Assuming the State argued the independent source doctrine in the district court, it does
not apply based on the unchallenged factual findings. The facts show that Detective Seibel
interviewed Ms. Wolfe, seized her phone, and then applied for a search warrant for the phone.
The State did not prove, based on these facts, that Detective Seibel’s acquisition of the search
warrant was genuinely independent from the illegal seizure. Moreover, these facts do not show
that probable cause for the search warrant would exist absent the information tainted by the
illegal seizure.
a. The search warrant was not genuinely independent from the illegal seizure
“It is well-established that the exclusionary rule provides that ‘evidence obtained as a
result of an unlawful search may not be used against the victim of the search.’” State v. Downing,
163 Idaho 26, 30 (2017) (quoting Page, 140 Idaho at 846). As an exception to the exclusionary
rule, the United States Supreme Court developed the independent source doctrine. Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). This doctrine “allows admission of evidence that has
been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Russo, 157 Idaho
at 306 (quoting Williams, 467 U.S. at 443). In other words, if the State’s “knowledge of [facts] is
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the [State]’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The State must establish the independent
source by a preponderance of the evidence. Williams, 467 U.S. at 444 & n.5.
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In Murray, for example, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
independent source doctrine applied to tangible evidence that the police had initially observed
during an unlawful entry, but later obtained pursuant to a search warrant. 487 U.S. at 535–36,
541–44. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the search warrant application
“did  not  mention  the  prior  entry”  or  “rely  on  any  observations  made  during  that  entry.” Id. at
535–36. “The ultimate question, therefore,” was “whether the search pursuant to warrant was in
fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here.” Id.
at 542. The Murray Court elaborated:
To determine whether the warrant was independent of the illegal entry, one must
ask whether it would have been sought even if what actually happened had not
occurred—not whether it would have been sought if something else had
happened. That is to say, what counts is whether the actual illegal search had any
effect in producing the warrant, not whether some hypothetical illegal search
would have aborted the warrant. Only that much is needed to assure that what
comes before the court is not the product of illegality; to go further than that
would be to expand our existing exclusionary rule.
Id. at 542 n.3. This exception to the exclusionary rule therefore serves to place law enforcement
in the same position but for the illegality. Otherwise, as explained in Murray, the exclusion of
evidence with an independent source “would put the police in a worse position than they would
have been in absent any error or violation.” Id. at 537 (quoting Williams, 467 U.S. at 443).
The United States Supreme Court’s application of the independent source doctrine in
Murray provides guidance for its application here. The Murray Court recognized that it would be
difficult for State to prove a truly independent source if the police kept the unlawfully seized
evidence until the use of the alleged independent source:  “So long as a later, lawful seizure is
genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well be difficult to establish where
the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession) there is no reason why the independent
source doctrine should not apply.” Id. at 542 (emphasis added). The Murray Court also outlined
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what would not qualify as a “genuinely independent source.” Id. If the police’s “decision to seek
the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, or if information
obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the
warrant,” then the search warrant was not genuinely independent. Id. To this end, the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case to lower court for further factual findings on the alleged
independent source. Id. at 543. Although “one could perhaps infer” the police “already planned”
to obtain the tangible evidence “through a warrant-authorized search,” especially since
preservation of evidence was the purpose of the initial illegal entry, that inference alone was not
“clear enough to justify the conclusion” of an independent source. Id. The lower court never
“explicitly” found that the police “would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier” illegally
entered the area to be searched. Id. Accordingly, the Murray Court held remand was necessary
for the lower court to make these independent source findings. Id. at 543–44.
Here, the State simply lacks the necessary factual findings to prove that Detective Seibel
obtained the evidence on Ms. Wolfe’s phone from an alleged independent source:  the phone
search warrant. For one, Detective Seibel kept the seized phone in the police’s possession until
the issuance of the warrant. See id. at 542. This cuts strongly against a purported independent
source for the evidence on the phone. Moreover, the State cannot prove that the search warrant
“would have been sought even if what actually happened”—the seizure of the phone—“had not
occurred.” Id. at 542 n.3. “That is to say,” the State cannot show that the “actual illegal” seizure
of the phone had no “effect in producing the warrant.” Id. The State is unable to meet its burden
because there is no evidence that the illegal seizure of the phone and the subsequent search
warrant  were  not  one  series  of  events  “flowing  directly  from”  Detective  Seibel’s  unlawful
conduct. Downing,  163  Idaho  at  32  (rejecting  the  State’s  inevitable  discovery  argument  to
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“speculate on the course of action the investigation could have taken absent” the illegality). On
the contrary, the evidence shows one causal chain:  Detective Seibel seized the phone, applied
for a search warrant for the phone, and then searched the phone. (R., pp.117–18, 164, 170.)
Although one could potentially infer that Detective Seibel already planned to apply for the search
warrant and would have done so regardless of her seizure of the phone, there is absolutely no
evidence in the record to support those inferences. The district court never made those findings
(likely because the independent source doctrine was not before it),7 and therefore the doctrine
does not apply to cure the initial illegal seizure.
Along  the  same  lines,  the  State  has  not  challenged  the  district  court’s  ruling  on  its
admission of the phone search warrant, State’s Exhibit 1, for a limited purpose. “When issues on
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered. . . . A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking,
not just if both are lacking.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). Here, the district court
admitted State’s Exhibit 1 for the limited purpose “to establish when a warrant was initially
sought following the seizure of the telephone.” (R., p.165.) This purpose restricts this Court’s
review of the search warrant. The district court did not admit the search warrant for its substance.
The State’s only argument, however, is that “[t]he evidence was obtained by execution of a
7 In the attenuation doctrine context, the district court found a single causal chain:
Analyzing each of the factors required by the attenuation doctrine there is no
intervening circumstance to justify application of the doctrine. The actions of law
enforcement from the time of seizure through the search were continuous in
nature.  There  was  no  intervening  circumstance  outside  of  these  acts,  such  as  a
pre-existing warrant or a warrant obtained on another basis, to justify police
action. The causal string is therefore not sufficiently broken to support the
doctrine of attenuation.
(R., p.170 (emphasis added).) The State has not challenged these facts or conclusions on appeal.
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search warrant that was untainted by any illegality in the seizure.” (App. Br., p.7.) The State did
not contest the district court’s evidentiary ruling. (See generally App. Br.) Without the substance
of  the  search  warrant  in  the  record,  the  State  simply  cannot  make  its  argument  that  the  search
warrant “was untainted by any illegality in the seizure.” (App. Br., p.7.) This Court cannot
review whether the illegal seizure tainted the search warrant without the search warrant itself.
Therefore, because the State lacks the necessary factual findings to demonstrate an independent
source, this Court should affirm the district court’s decision.
b. The information in the search warrant was tainted by the illegal seizure
Finally, even if the search warrant (reviewed for its substance) could be an independent
source, the State still has not shown that the information in Detective Seibel’s warrant
application was untainted by the information gained from the illegal seizure.8 This is where the
State’s reliance on Davis is misplaced. (See App. Br., pp.6–7.) In Davis, the Court of Appeals
held the independent source doctrine applied to the subsequent warrant-authorized search of the
defendant’s cell phone after its initial illegal seizure and search. 159 Idaho at 492–95. In holding
the independent doctrine applied, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the police “coordinated
their efforts before” they arrested the defendant and seized his phone. Id. at 494. Moreover, one
of the detectives testified that he intended to determine whether to apply for a search warrant for
the phone after his pre-planned interviews with the alleged victims, not after the phone’s seizure.
Id. As such, the information in the search warrant application, excluding the information
obtained from the illegal search, “came from a wholly independent source.” Id. That untainted
information still provided probable cause for the search of the phone. Id. at 494–95. Because
8 Although the State has the burden to provide an adequate record, see, e.g., State v. Willoughby,
147 Idaho 482, 488 (2009), Ms. Wolfe has moved to augment the record with State’s Exhibit 1.
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there was “sufficient non-tainted evidence for a search warrant,” the evidence was not subject to
suppression. Id. at 493; see also id. at 494–95.
In the case at bar, the State has not shown that Detective Seibel’s decision to seek the
warrant was independent, let alone untainted by, the phone’s seizure. Again, there is no evidence
in the record that Detective Seibel determined whether to apply for the search warrant before the
illegal seizure and based solely upon independent information. See Davis, 159 Idaho at 494. If
Detective Seibel’s “decision to seek the warrant was prompted by” her seizure of the phone, then
the search warrant does not cure the initial illegality. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542.
More importantly, Detective Seibel included information gained from the illegal seizure
in her affidavit for the search warrant, and this tainted information established probable cause for
the phone. “[A] search warrant is not validly issued if, once the illegally obtained evidence is
excluded from the evidence presented to the magistrate, there is insufficient information to
provide the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant.” Davis, 159 Idaho at 494
(quoting State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779 (1999)). “In order for a search warrant to be
valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a crime may be
found in a particular place.” Id. at 495. A review of the warrant application shows that the only
information establishing probable cause to search Ms. Wolfe’s phone came from her
incriminating statements made to Detective Seibel after the illegal seizure. (See Def’s Aug.
R., pp.6–14.) Detective Seibel averred:
Monica entered the Nampa Police Department Interview room with a black in
color  smart  phone.  I  seized  Monica’s  cell  phone  and  advised  that  it  would  be
placed in evidence. Monica asked me what I would be looking for on the cell
phone. I explained to Monica, any evidence related to committing murder, staging
a suicide, solicitation of murder, poisoning, and antifreeze. I asked Monica if
when  the  cell  phone  was  searched,  would  there  be  any  text  messages  or  emails
asking  people  to  kill  Robert.  She  stated,  “yes”.  I  asked  Monica  how  many  text
messages would be related to having Robert killed. She stated, “a lot”. I asked
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Monica, what was I supposed to make of that. She stated, “you have to take them
in  context  .  .  .  if  I  was  angry  .  .  .  or  joking”.  I  seized  Monica’s  cell  phone  and
placed it in airplane mode.
(Def.’s Aug. R., p.11 (sic).) No other facts give rise to probable cause that evidence of a crime
may be found on Ms. Wolfe’s phone. (See Def’s Aug. R., pp.9–11.) To be sure, Detective
Seibel’s affidavit recites other information pertinent to Ms. Wolfe’s alleged commission of the
crimes, but only Ms. Wolfe’s statements establish probable cause for the phone. (See Def’s Aug.
R., pp.9–11.) These statements, however, are tainted by the initial seizure. There is no evidence
that Detective Seibel would have asked Ms. Wolfe about the contents of her phone or that
Ms. Wolfe would have provided inculpatory responses but for the seizure. By using this tainted
information in her affidavit, Detective Seibel is put in a better, not the same, position than she
would have been if no misconduct had occurred. This runs contrary to the purpose of
independent source doctrine. See Williams, 467 U.S. at 443 (“The independent source doctrine
teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest
in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the
police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or
misconduct had occurred.”); Russo, 157 Idaho at 307 (“Disregarding the unlawfully obtained
information  when  determining  probable  cause  would  put  the  police  in  the  same,  not  a  worse,
position than they would have been in absent the misconduct.”). Thus, unlike Davis, the
information obtained by Detective Seibel in support of probable cause to search the phone did
not come “from a wholly independent source.” 159 Idaho at 494. It came from the illegal
seizure.9
9 Similarly, the information establishing probable cause to search Ms. Wolfe’s Google account
also came directly from the initial unlawful seizure. In Detective Seibel’s affidavit to search the
Google account, Detective Seibel included the same paragraph from her affidavit to search the
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In summary, if preserved, the independent source doctrine does not apply because the
State did not show that the search warrant for the phone was a genuinely independent source of
evidence  from  the  illegal  seizure  of  the  phone.  Further,  if  the  doctrine  applies  and  the  search
warrant was independent, “there is insufficient information to provide the probable cause
necessary for the issuance of a warrant” once the tainted information is excluded from the
warrant application. Davis, 159 Idaho at 494 (quoting Revenaugh, 133 Idaho at 779). The tainted
information is the only information to establish probable cause for the phone. Accordingly, the
search  of  Ms.  Wolfe’s  phone  remains  unlawful,  and  the  district  court  properly  granted  her
motion to suppress in part.
CONCLUSION
Ms.  Wolfe  respectfully  requests  this  Court  affirm  the  district  court’s  order  granting  in
part and denying in part her motion to suppress.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2019.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
phone regarding her seizure of the phone and Ms. Wolfe’s statements. (Compare Def.’s Aug.
R., p.11, with State’s Aug. R., pp.11–12.) Then, for the Google account, Detective Seibel simply
added that law enforcement searched the phone and observed the Google account, and that she
“believe[d]” information in the account “would assist” her “in obtaining evidence related to
solicitation of murder.” (State’s Aug. R., p.14.) Notably, she did not state that any information on
the  phone,  such  as  text  messages,  contained  evidence  of  the  alleged  crimes.  (State’s  Aug.
R., p.12.) Like the phone search warrant, the subsequent Google search warrant is not an
independent source of evidence.
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